EPFL

POCS: Blocking Internet Flooding

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Bandwidth flooding



Target: tail-circuit bandwidth

Network filtering



State: {A, R}

Functionality: if ({packet.src, packet.dst} in State)
block packet;

Block attackers at the receiver's gateway

State

State: {attacker, receiver} pairs

Where: receiver's gateway

Managed: locally

Internet routers



Network filtering is expensive

Network filtering



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Distributed flooding



Target: filtering resources + tail circuit

Distributed filtering

Identify routers close to attack sources

Ask them to block attack traffic

Need a filter-propagation protocol

Filter propagation



Filter propagation



Filter propagation



Malicious filtering requests?



Filter propagation continued



Filter propagation continued



G_R proves it is on the path by 3-way handshake

Busy attackers?



Busy attackers?



Busy attackers?



Filter propagation continued



Keep in-network filters temporarily

Filter propagation continued



Disconnection = cheap filtering

Repeat offenders?



Repeat offenders?



Repeat offenders?



Repeat offenders?



Keep filtering state in the control plane

Non-cooperative networks?



Non-cooperative networks?



... get disconnected from R

State



State: {attacker, receiver} pairs

Where: control plane of attacker's gateway

Managed: filter-propagation protocol

Distributed flooding

Target: filtering resources + tail circuit

Ticket-based authorization

Give tickets to well behaved senders

Verify tickets inside the network

Need ticket distribution and verification

Ticket distribution



Ticket verification



Ticket verification



Ticket construction



S cannot guess the value of a valid ticket

Stateless filtering

State: -

Functionality: if (not verify(ticket))
block packet;

State



State: {sender, receiver} pairs

Where: senders

Managed: ticket-distribution protocol

Denial of ticket



Target: tail circuit + ticket distribution

Tickets + network filtering



Block attackers in the network

Distributed denial of ticket



Target: filtering resources

+ tail circuit

+ ticket distribution

Tickets + distributed filtering

Need a filter-propagation protocol

State

State: {sender/attacker, receiver} pairs

Where: senders + network

Managed: ticket distribution + filtering propagation

Outsource ticket distribution



Outsource ticket distribution



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

Target: the DNS infrastructure

Fair-share the Internet

- Fixed number of connections per sender
- Reduces filtering state

Changes the nature of the Internet