

Lecture 9:

Network Security

Katerina Argyraki, EPFL

Security properties


- Confidentiality
 - * only the sender and the receiver understand the contents of the message
- Authenticity
 - * the message is from whom it claims to be
- Integrity
 - * the message was not changed along the way

Outline

- Building blocks
- Providing security properties
- Securing Internet protocols
- Operational security


Outline

- Building blocks
- Providing security properties
- Securing Internet protocols
- Operational security




●
Alice

communication channel




●
Bob





Encryption & decryption

- **Encryption:** plaintext in, ciphertext out
- **Decryption:** ciphertext in, plaintext out
- **Ciphertext:** ideally, should reveal no information about the plaintext




key





●
Alice



●
Bob


$$\text{key} \{ \text{key} \{ \text{plaintext} \} \} = \text{plaintext}$$

Symmetric key cryptography


- Alice and Bob **share the same key**
 - * used both for the encryption and decryption algorithm
- Use key to “**scramble**” the plaintext
 - * stream ciphers & block ciphers
 - * RC4, AES, Blowfish


Symmetric key cryptography

- Challenge: how to share a key?
 - * out of band
 - * not always an option




key+ key-





●
Alice



●
Bob

$$\text{key-} \{ \text{key+} \{ \text{plaintext} \} \} = \text{plaintext}$$

$$\text{key+} \{ \text{key-} \{ \text{plaintext} \} \} = \text{plaintext}$$

Asymmetric key cryptography

- Alice and Bob use **different** keys
 - * public (key+) and private (key-) key
- There is a special relationship between them
 - * $\text{key-}\{\text{key+}\{\text{plaintext}\}\} = \text{plaintext}$
 - * $\text{key+}\{\text{key-}\{\text{plaintext}\}\} = \text{plaintext}$
 - * RSA, DSA

Asymmetric key cryptography


- **Public key is not secret**
 - * only private key is secret
 - * enough to guarantee secrecy
- But you can't guess one from the other
 - * Alice/Bob can share key+ with everyone
 - * without revealing information about key-


Asymmetric key cryptography

- Challenge: **computationally expensive**
 - * sophisticated encryption/decryption algorithms based on number theory

Two approaches to crypto

- Symmetric: **faster** but out-of-band **secret sharing**
- Asymmetric: **no** out-of-band **secret sharing** but **slower**





Cryptographic hash function

- Maps larger input space to smaller hash space
- Hash ideally reveals no information on input
- Should be hard to identify two inputs that lead to the same hash

How is hashing different
from encryption?


Building blocks

- **Symmetric key encryption/decryption**
 - * Alice and Bob share the same secret key
 - * challenge: exchanging the secret key
- **Asymmetric key encryption/decryption**
 - * Alice and Bob use different keys
 - * challenge: computationally more expensive
- **Cryptographic hash function**
 - * produces a hash of the original message

Outline


- Building blocks
- Providing security properties
- Securing Internet protocols
- Operational security

Providing confidentiality




●
Alice

●
Eve




●
Bob



●
Alice

●
Eve



●
Bob

Providing confidentiality

- With symmetric key crypto
 - * Alice encrypts message with shared key
 - * only Bob can decrypt it (with shared key)
- With asymmetric key crypto
 - * Alice encrypts message with **Bob's public key**
 - * only Bob can decrypt it (with **his private key**)

Providing authenticity

Alice

Bob




Persa

Bob




Alice

Bob




Persa

Bob



Alice

Bob



Alice

Bob

I am Alice
gfhjsgfjf67

key{I am Alice}
= gfhjsgfjf67

Persa


Bob

I am Alice
sghaagshaj

key{I am Alice}
= gfhjsgfjf67


Alice

Bob



Alice


Bob



Message Authentication Code
(MAC)

Alice

Bob




Message Authentication Code

- $\text{hash} \{ \text{key}, \text{plaintext} \}$
- Proof that this particular plaintext was sent by an entity that knows the key

Alice


Bob



Digital signature

Alice

Bob




Digital signature

- Generate: $\text{key}^- \{ \text{hash} \{ \text{message} \} \}$
- Verify: $\text{key}^+ \{ \dots \} == \text{hash} \{ \text{message} \}$
- Proof that this particular message was sent by an entity who knows the private key that matches public key key^+


Alice

Bob



Alice

Bob



Providing authenticity

- With symmetric key crypto
 - * Alice appends MAC
 - * Bob checks that it is correct (using shared key)
- With asymmetric key crypto
 - * Alice appends digital signature (using her private key)
 - * Bob checks that it is correct (using Alice's public key)


Providing authenticity

- Use **nonce** to prevent replay attacks
 - * Alice appends MAC of nonce + message
 - * Bob verifies that it is correct (using shared key)

Providing data integrity

Alice


Bob



Message Authentication Code
(MAC)

Alice

Bob



I am Alice
Alice-key-{ hash{ I am Alice } }


Digital signature

Providing integrity


- With exactly the same mechanisms that provide authenticity

Alice

Bob




Preventing man-in-the-middle attacks




●
Alice

●
Eve



●
Bob



"10h00 "

"10h00"

"10h00"

"10h00"

Manuel-key+

encryption algorithm

Manuel-key-

decryption algorithm

encryption algorithm

Bob-key+

decryption algorithm

Bob-key-

gfjdhsjfsgh



Alice

ztie67843





Manuel




Bob

Man in the middle

- Can break confidentiality
 - * Manuel convinces Alice to use his public key instead of Bob's
 - * decrypts and re-encrypts Alice-Bob messages
- Cause: no way to verify public-keys
 - * when Alice learns Bob's public key, she must verify that it is indeed his








"10h00"

"11h00"

It's from Alice



10h00, gfjd

11h00, ztie



Alice

Manuel

Bob

Man in the middle

- Can break authenticity/data integrity
 - * Manuel convinces Bob to use his public key instead of Alice's
 - * re-computes the digital signatures on Alice-Bob messages
- Cause: no way to verify public-keys
 - * when Bob learns Alice's public key, he must verify that it is indeed hers

Solution: public-key certificates

- Rely on trusted **certificate authority (CA)**
 - * an entity that both Alice & Bob trust
- CA produces **certificate of Bob's public key**
 - * { Bob owns Bob-key+ }
- CA **digitally signs** the certificate
 - * CA-key-{ hash{ Bob owns Bob-key+ } }

Solution: public-key certificates

- Alice needs Bob's true public key
 - * to communicate with Bob with confidentiality and/or authenticity/data integrity
- Bob sends public key & certificate
 - * $CA\text{-key}-\{\text{hash}\{\text{Bob owns Bob-key}, \dots\}\}$
 - * guarantees this is Bob's public key
- Alice needs **CA's true public key**
 - * to check $CA\text{-key}-\{\text{hash}\{\text{Bob owns Bob-key}, \dots\}\}$

Bootstrapping is unavoidable


- Secure communication requires **some form of shared state**
- Symmetric crypto: secret key
- Asymmetric crypto: CA's public key
 - * typically stored in browser

Asymmetric crypto reduces bootstrapping information

Outline

- Building blocks
- Providing security properties
- Securing Internet protocols
- Operational security

●
Alice



`symm-key { symm-key { message } }`




●
Bob


`Bob-key- { Bob-key+ { symm-key } }`

Alice-key- $\{ \text{hash} \{ \text{message} \} \}$


Alice




Alice-key+{ Alice-key- { hash { message } } }



Alice-key- $\{ \text{hash}\{ \text{message} \} \}$


●
Alice



Bob-key+ $\{ \text{symm-key} \}$

Alice

online store




Securing TCP applications

- Server sends its public key & certificate
- Client creates and sends a symmetric master key
 - * encrypts it with server's public key
- Both use master key to create 4 session keys
 - * 1 key for encrypting client --> server data
 - * 1 key for creating MAC for client --> server data
 - * same for server --> client data


Alice

online store



Alice

online store



Securing TCP applications

- Client organizes data in records
 - * each record has a sequence number
- Creates MAC for each record + sequence #
 - * using one of the 4 session keys
- Encrypts the data + MAC for each record
 - * using (another) one of the 4 session keys

Key ideas

- Combination of symmetric/asymmetric keys
 - * asymmetric key crypto to exchange symmetric keys
 - * symmetric key crypto for confidentiality, authenticity, & integrity
 - * symmetric key crypto is faster
- Seq. numbers to avoid reordering attacks
 - * organize data in records with seq. numbers
 - * compute MAC on record data + seq. number

Outline

- Building blocks
- Providing security properties
- Securing Internet protocols
- Operational security

action	src IP	dst IP	proto	src port	dst port
allow	167.67/16	any	TCP	any	80
allow	any	167.67/16	TCP	80	any
deny	all	all	all	all	all