CS-234 Technologies for Democratic society

Fall 2024

Week 5

Vote counting schemes / Election methods Properties desired - Election systems No double counting - fairness/equality Transparency - ensure Pairness correctness Understandability - easy to use Accessibility - to everyone esp v challenges Confidentiality of vote Outcome represents "will" of population, common interest Practical, teasible logistically, inexpensive

Vote - counting methods Assuming registration is "done" (secure/correct/...) how to design bullats (ask for what?) - count hallots? Pase case: majority rule - winner has >50% of use Complication: 3+ candidates, not always a majority Further : multi-winner, multi-candidate *Simple/stupid: plurality voting widespread agreement - don't want this!

Properties desired in vote-coupling? -Should always decide -Elect the will of the majority (problem: no majority) - Elect Condorcet winner Wins pairwise elections against all other condidates - imput: rankings (not just single choice) Condorcet Cycles - no Condorcet winner - Determinism, -Fair : no candidate has advantage - Simplicity, understandability, accessibility - Avoid strategic voting, incentive compatibility encourage valers to express true preference

Scenardos of interest Letteender/right "Centrist - Favering " arguned Condorcet > Bob A>B>C/B>AZ C>B>A IRV: non-Centrist" system Left/Conver/right ABCD 24 25 24 \$ 26 CODS ... CODOSA

Vote - counting methods - Majority rule (only for 2-candidate dections) - Plurality (fails to avoid strategic voting) - Runoff voting - can favor centrists, ... - Single transferable vote(STV)/ Instant runoff voting (IRV) - Approval voting